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Examining The Role Of Fairness 
In High Stakes Allocation Decisions
By: Todd L. Cherry & John A. List  
Abstract
Experimental evidence has prompted a debate over the nature of utility functions in which 
people are concerned about the amount others earn. We examine this issue by examining 
behavior across three variants of the dictator game. Using data from 195 dictators 
allocating as much as $100 each, we observe that the origin of endowments is critically 
linked to allocation behavior: when subjects could reasonably believe that 
disproportionately low offers would be considered “fair,” only 8–12 percent of dictators 
make positive offers. Further, there is evidence that an increase in stakes leads to a less than 
proportionate increase in monies transferred. Finally, examining the comparative static 
results from these allocation decisions, we find that recent theoretical models do a 
respectable job of explaining the data patterns
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do not ubiquitously send zero dollars to their partner (Camerer and Thaler, 1995). Many authors
have attempted to clarify this behavior by examining individual behavior within a theoretical
framework. This line of research includes models due to Levine (1998), Bolton and Ockenfels
(2000) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999), as well as Andreoni et al.’s (1998) road map for building
a more predictive model of fairness. More recently, Levitt and List (2006) provide a framework
that stresses the fact that utility maximization is driven not only by wealth maximization, but also
by an individual’s desire to “do the right thing,” or make the “moral” choice. For our purposes,
they argue that an understanding of the context of the situation is critical when considering the
weight that an individual places on “doing the right thing.”
Inextricably related to these studies is an influential line of research that suggests there is a 
critical link between social isolation and Nash play in bargaining games (e.g., Hoffman et al., 
1994, hereafter HMSS). The experimental design in this line of work permits an examination 
of the comparative static effect of varying social isolation while holding the level of “fairness” 
constant. Reported results suggest that many individuals become Nash players as social isolation 
increases.
Rather than examining the effect of changes in social isolation, in this study, we hold social
isolation constant and examine the comparative static effect of varying degrees of perceived
fairness. We accomplish this goal by analyzing decisions from nearly 200 subjects in dictator
games that varied the level of stakes from $20 to 100 and varied the degree of “fairness” associated
with disproportionately low offers. Perceived fairness was varied by moving from the typical
dictator baseline treatment to asymmetric and symmetric designs that served to allocate initial
wealth based on individual proficiency on a 45-min quiz. In the asymmetric treatment, only the
dictator was afforded the opportunity to earn wealth, whereas in the symmetric treatment both
the dictator and responder had a chance to earn money.
Our data provide three major insights. First, the earnings component induced dictators to 
exhibit a considerably higher rate of self-interested behavior than previously reported (see, e.g., 
HMSS, 1994; Bohnet and Frey, 1999). In the limit, we observe that only 8–12 percent of dictators 
make positive offers. Second, an increase in stakes leads to a less than proportionate increase in 
monies transferred. Finally, certain aspects of our results are explained well by the comparative 
static predictions found in recent theoretical models.
1. Experimental design and hypotheses
Subjects who were unfamiliar with experimental games were recruited from the undergraduate
student body at a large university in the U.S. We conducted three sessions: a baseline treatment that
was identical to the HMSS baseline and two earnings treatments: an asymmetric (77 pairs) and
a symmetric (78 pairs) treatment. In all respects, we were careful to follow identical procedures
in each session to ensure that the parameter social isolation remained constant, thus, ensuring
that any notion of strategic reciprocity would not change across treatments. Participants were
randomly assigned to two groups, with one group placed in room A and the other placed in
room B. The two groups did not have any contact before, during, or after the session. Within each
group, subjects were allowed to talk only to administrators. Each treatment had at most two stages,
no money. The dictator game is a simple variant of the ultimatum game. In the dictator game, strategic concerns are absent
as the proposer simply states what the split will be and the proposer has no veto power, rendering the proposed split as
effective.
Predictions from the game-theoretic literature are frequently rather extreme, often leading 
expectations to be unmet. Perhaps, the most well known example in the economics literature is a class 
of games that includes the popular ultimatum and dictator variants.1 Although, the dictator game 
arguably presents the simplest possible strategy space for subjects to understand, proposers
Table 1
Experimental design
Treatment (n) Game Earnings Stakes ($)
B$20 (20) Dictator None 20
B$100 (20) Dictator None 100
A$20 (34) Dictator Asymmetric 20
A$100 (43) Dictator Asymmetric 100
S$20 (37) Dictator Symmetric 20
S$100 (41) Dictator Symmetric 100
earnings and allocation, and each had a written protocol to ensure consistency. As is typical, no
subject participated in more than one treatment, so our results rely on purely between-subject
variation.
The earnings stage informed the designated group(s) that they would earn money by taking a
quiz before moving to the second and final stage of the experiment. Subjects were informed that
a simple rule would determine their earnings in the first stage of the experiment: if they answered
10 or more questions correctly they would receive $100; if they answered fewer than 10 questions
correctly they would receive $20.2 After addressing all questions, subjects were informed that
they had 45 min to complete the quiz. After the allotted time elapsed, the quiz was collected and
graded.
The allocation stage randomly matched subjects across groups with the person in room A being
the first-mover (proposer). Instructions for the dictator game were read aloud to both groups, and
all questions were addressed. The allocation (dictator) games were one-shot and were done over
the first-mover’s earnings. To conclude, final earnings were determined, and subjects departed
individually with cash payment.
An asymmetric earnings design provides our initial deviation from the baseline. In this treat-
ment, only subjects assigned to room A participated in the earnings session. Subjects in room
A were informed that “the person in room B has not had the opportunity to earn any money.”
For time management, subjects assigned to room B arrived 1 hour after those assigned to room
A. The next deviation from the baseline was a symmetric earnings treatment. In the symmetric
earnings treatment, all subjects (rooms A and B) participated in the earnings session. Subjects
in both rooms were informed that “people in rooms A and B have earned an amount of money
by participating in identical sessions.” Subjects in both rooms were further informed that “the
person in room B does not decide how to split his or her earnings; he or she keeps all of the
earnings.”
Given the dichotomous outcome of the earnings session, we are provided with an opportunity
to test the difference between low ($20) and high ($100) stakes within the two treatment types.
Our experimental design is summarized in Table 1, with treatments sub-categorized as baseline
with low (high) stakes B$ 20 (B$100), and asymmetric (symmetric) earnings with low stakes
A$20 (S$20), and asymmetric (symmetric) earnings with high stakes A$100 (S$100). Table 1
also provides sample sizes across the cells, which tend to be larger than previous studies and
suggest that more than half of the subjects earned the right to distribute $100; 43 out of 77 (41
out of 78) in the asymmetric (symmetric) treatment answered 10 or more of the 17 questions
correctly.
2 The quiz is taken verbatim from List and Cherry (2000).
Table 2 
Aggregate behavior
Treatment (n) Rate of positive offers Rate of equal splits Average positive offera
B$20 (20) 0.5000 0.2500 0.3300
B$100 (20) 0.4500 0.1500 0.2831
A$20 (34) 0.2941 0.1176 0.3600
A$100 (43) 0.4186 0.0697 0.2083
S$20 (37) 0.0811 0.0541 0.4333
S$100 (41) 0.1220 0.0488 0.3100
a Reported as percentage of total amount available in the allocation decision (average positive offer ignores zero-
offers).
Making F(•) the population distribution of offers, our series of main null hypotheses take
the form H0: F(Ti$Z) = F(Tj$Z), where i, j are treatment indicators for baseline asymmetric and
symmetric, and i = j and Z represents stakes, therefore, Z = $20, $100. A secondary null hypothesis
of interest concerns stakes: H0: F(Ti$20) = F(Ti$100). Rejecting the first null hypothesis in favor
of the appropriate one-sided alternative suggests that relaxing the “fairness” constraint induces
behavior more in line with the standard equilibrium prediction. Concerning the secondary null
hypotheses, if we reject the null, inference would be that stakes and allocation behavior are
correlated. This would provide evidence of the predictive power of the Fehr and Schmidt model,
which predicts giving should increase with higher stakes (the model of Bolton and Ockenfels is
agnostic on this issue).
2. Experimental results
Table 2 summarizes the individual data obtained from our three dictator games. Figs. 1–3
use these data to depict graphically the frequency distribution for each treatment. Of first note is
the finding that our baseline experimental data are qualitatively equivalent to results reported in
other dictator games. For example, our data are in large part consistent with the data reported in
references, for example, Hoffman et al. (1996), Eckel and Grossman (1996) and Bohnet and Frey
(1999), as we find that rates of positive offers, equal splits and average positive offers are in the
range of 50, 20 and 30 percent.
Moving to our stakes hypotheses, given that there is so little variation in the data, we cannot
provide a test with a substantial amount of power. Yet, as per the summary statistics in Table 2
and the figures, there is evidence that an increase in stakes leads to a less than proportionate
increase in monies transferred. Nevertheless, such differences between the data across the $20
and $100 treatments cannot be detected statistically using a Wilcoxon nonparametric test, as we
cannot reject the null hypothesis that the distributions are identical across stakes conditions in the
baseline, asymmetric or symmetric treatments at the conventional p < .05 level.3 Given that the
stakes treatment did not significantly alter allocation decisions, we pool the $20 and $100 data
for the statistical analysis below.
3 Given that this test may lack power (see, e.g., Forsythe et al.), we also tested for distributional differences using a
Kolmogorov–Smirnov (KS) test. In each case, we could not reject the null hypothesis of identical distributions at even
the p = .50 level using the KS test.
Fig. 1. (A) Experiment B$20 (dictator baseline with unearned $20). (B) Experiment B$100 (dictator baseline with
unearned $100).
Comparing data across the baseline and earnings treatments provides an interesting contrast.
Whereas our baseline treatments yield data in the spirit of the existing literature, dictators acting
over earned wealth have distributions shifted toward lower offers in each case. Figs. 1–3 show
the declination of offers as we move toward the treatments that fully relax the “fairness” con-
straint. Wilcoxon nonparametric tests reinforce what the naked eye can readily see: although the
asymmetric earnings and baseline distributions are not different from one another at conventional
levels (z = 1.14), we can reject equivalency of the symmetric and baseline distributions at the
p < .01 level (z = 3.24). In addition, we find that the asymmetric and symmetric treatments yield
different distributions at better than the p < .01 level (z = 2.70).
Similar inference obtains when we consider the proportion of dominant strategy play (giving
zero). In contrast to the 50–55 percent of theoretically correct play observed in our base-
line treatments, dictators acting over asymmetric earnings followed theory in 58–71 percent
of the allocation decisions. The movement toward the standard equilibrium prediction con-
tinued when dictators acted over symmetric earnings; in 88–92 percent of cases dictators
kept everything for themselves. According to a test of proportions, these differences in the-
oretically correct play between the symmetric and baseline (asymmetric) treatment are each
Fig. 2. (A) Experiment A$20 (asymmetric earnings of $20). (B) Experiment S$20 (symmetric earnings of $20).
significantly different from zero at the p < .01 level (symmetric versus baseline: z = 4.55; sym-
metric versus asymmetric: z = 3.85).4 Furthermore, in the symmetric treatment, the proportion of
zero offers was not significantly different from 100 percent at conventional significance levels
(z = 1.82).
Our experimental design is sufficiently rich to allow one final test of existing theories of social
utility. In our view, a descriptive model of social utility should yield predictions about when
fairness or inequality should matter a great deal, leading to large deviations from self-interest,
and when behavior should be consistent with self-interest. In this regard, certain extant theories
describe an important aspect of our data. When comparing results across the asymmetric and
symmetric designs, we find that the Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999)
models have a good deal of predictive power; giving is significantly lower in the symmetric
4 Table 2 also reports that the frequency of equal splits decreased dramatically when the “fairness” aspect was relaxed.
While the baseline treatment observed equal splits in 25 and 15 percent of allocation decisions, equal splits occurred in
only 9 percent (7 of 77) of the asymmetric allocation decisions and only 5 percent (4 of 78) of the symmetric earnings
allocation decisions.
Fig. 3. (A) Experiment A$100 (asymmetric earnings of $100). (B) Experiment S$100 (symmetric earnings of $100).
treatment as predicted by their inequality aversion theories.5 This data pattern is also consistent
with the intuition from Levitt and List (2006).
3. Conclusion
The importance of experimental results from allocation games is more than academic curiosity,
as some scholars believe certain results may represent a fatal flaw in standard economic theory:
the commonly coined “fall of homo-economicus.” In this study, we presented experimental results
from an allocation game in which subjects earned initial wealth. Examining experimental data
from nearly 200 subjects in dictator games that varied the level of stakes from $20 to 100 and varied
the degree of “fairness” associated with disproportionately low offers, we found that fairness
considerations are quite strong: only 8–12 percent of dictators made positive offers when the
fairness constraint was sufficiently relaxed. Our data also suggest that an increase in stakes leads
to a less than proportionate increase in monies transferred. Finally, certain patterns in our data are
consonant with comparative static predictions of recent models.6
5 These models also predict that giving should be greater in S$100 versus S$20. While the data are not consonant
with this prediction, it should be stressed that since dictators did not know the probability weights over their partner’s
allocation, this test is not clean.
6 While our data suggest that fairness matters, the literature has pointed to several other aspects that influence behavior
as well (see, e.g., Nelson’s 2002 ultimatum game study).
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